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ABSTRACT: This Insight comments on the recent judgment of the Court of Justice in Associação Sindical 
dos Juízes Portugueses (judgment of 27 February 2018, case C-64/16). The Court took advantage of 
this case to emphasise the potential of EU law to consolidate and defend the rule of law structures in 
the Member States. The Court discovered a justiciable rule of law clause in Art. 19, para. 1, TEU, which 
enshrines the principle of effective judicial protection before national courts. This provision makes 
the enforcement of rule of law standards vis-à-vis the Member States more straightforward as com-
pared to the enforcement of Art. 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. In the future, Art. 
19, para. 1, TEU could be enforced by means of infringement proceedings under Art. 268 TFEU to 
counteract the undermining of judicial independence at the national level. 
 
KEYWORDS: rule of law – effective judicial protection – judicial system – national courts – judicial in-
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I. Athena’s dilemma 
In “Eumenides”, a part of Aeschylus’ trilogy, the “Oresteia”,1 Athena was faced with a 
dispute between the deities, Apollo and the three Erinyes, over the fate of Orestes. 
Orestes killed his own mother to avenge his father, a good king, whom she had previ-
ously killed. Orestes was carrying out an order from Apollo. Hence, Apollo was defend-
ing Orestes against the Erinyes, more ancient guardians of primeval tribal laws, also 
known as the Furies. The Erinyes demanded Orestes’s death to enforce an ancient rule 
according to which the death of a relative must be ruthlessly avenged, regardless of the 
assassin’s motives. The conflicted deities submitted the dispute to Athena’s judgment. 
To decide the fate of Orestes, she also had to rule on the primacy of the modern or the 
 
* Researcher in Law, European University Institute, michal.krajewski@eui.eu. 
1 AESCHYLUS, Eumenides, in AESCHYLUS, ORESTEIA, translated by A.H. SOMMERSTEIN, Harvard: Harvard 
University Press, 2014. 
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primeval legal order, represented respectively by Apollo and the Erinyes.2 Athena was 
well aware that if the Erinyes did not get a victorious outcome, they could in revenge 
bring a plague on her city. Like many judges facing politically sensitive cases, at first 
Athena ascertained whether she could deny jurisdiction and, thus, get rid of the prob-
lem altogether.3 Alas, the attempt to do so failed. In this case, Athena decided to estab-
lish an independent tribunal from among the most respected of her citizens. She also 
instructed her tribunal to break with the ancient judicial procedure based on the oaths 
submitted by the parties. Instead, she prescribed a fair procedure governed by the rules 
on evidence and equality of arms.4 Thus, Athena became the first enforcer of the rule of 
law recorded in history.5 Following the trial, the tribunal acquitted Orestes. This en-
raged the defeated Erinyes. Fortunately, Athena managed to convince them to give up 
their wrath, by offering them a place among deities worshipped in her city. 
A similar dilemma was brought before the Court of Justice in the case Associação Sin-
dical dos Juízes Portugueses (ASJP).6 The dispute before the referring court concerned the 
reduction of the Portuguese judges’ remuneration in the framework of EU austerity 
measures. But the Court had to respond to far more important questions. Like Athena 
facing the dispute about the primacy of the new or the old laws, the Court had to decide 
whether the new legal order of the EU can interfere directly in the organisation of national 
judicial branch – an issue which has hitherto been perceived as a prerogative of national 
authorities, deeply embedded in the concept of national sovereignty. Notably, it has been 
a commonplace to see the ASJP case as an opportunity to lay the groundwork for future 
cases against Poland and its government’s controversial judicial reforms.7 On the one 
hand, the Court must have surely considered arguments of those who, like Apollo, argue 
in favour of the new legal order, demand the assertive enforcement of common Europe-
an values and criticise the EU institutions for their poor response to the undermining of 
judicial independence in Poland or Hungary.8 One the other hand, the Court must have 
 
2 C. MEIER, The Greek Discovery of Politics, translated by D. MCLINTOCK, Harvard: Harvard University 
Press, 1990, pp. 82-138. 
3 AESCHYLUS, Eumenides, cit., pp. 416-417. 
4 C. MEIER, The Greek Discovery of Politics, cit. 
5 L. MAY, S. FYEE, The Legitimacy of International Criminal Tribunals, in N. HAYASHI, C.M. BAILLET (eds), 
The Legitimacy of International Criminal Tribunals, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017, p. 26. 
6 Court of Justice, judgment of 27 February 2018, case C-64/16, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses. 
7 M. TABOROWSKI, CJEU Opens the Door for the Commission to Reconsider Charges against Poland, in Ver-
fassungsblog, 13 March 2018, verfassungsblog.de; D. SARMIENTO, On Constitutional Mode, in Despite Our Dif-
ferences Blog, 6 March 2018, despiteourdifferencesblog.wordpress.com; M. OVÁDEK, Has the CJEU just Recon-
figured the EU Constitutional Order?, in Verfassungsblog, 28 February 2018, verfassungsblog.de. 
8 See, for instance, D. KOCHENOV, The EU and the Rule of Law – Naïveté or a Grand Design?, in M. 
ADAMS, A. MEUWESE, E.H. BALLIN (eds), Constitutionalism and the Rule of Law: Bridging Idealism and Real-
ism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2017, pp. 419-455. 
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taken into account that reactions of these Member States’ governments are, like those of 
the Erinyes, difficult to predict but potentially serious. 
Perhaps surprisingly, the Court declared the question admissible. In the past, it had 
rather avoided the politically sensitive cases regarding the review of Portuguese austeri-
ty measures.9 Even more surprisingly, the Court was not looking for a link between the 
impugned Portuguese measure and a concrete EU provision. Such a link would be nec-
essary to trigger the applicability of Art. 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
EU (the Charter), which relates to the fundamental right to an effective remedy and a 
fair trial before an independent court. Instead, the Court relied solely on Art. 19, para. 1, 
TEU relating to the national obligation of ensuring effective judicial protection in the 
fields covered by EU law. Was it right to assert its jurisdiction and derive standards of 
judicial independence from Art. 19, para. 1, TEU? 
In this Insight, I reflect on this question. After recalling the case’s details (Section II), I 
propose a conceptualisation of the difference between legal norms stemming from Art. 
19, para. 1, TEU and Art. 47 of the Charter. I argue that Art. 19, para. 1, TEU has turned 
out to be a judicially enforceable rule of law clause (Section III.1). Although it arguably 
expresses the same normative content as Art. 47 of the Charter, it has a different scope 
of application. As a result, Art. 19, para. 1, TEU makes the obligations of the Member 
States relating to the rule of law more easily enforceable before the Court of Justice 
(Section III.2). In conclusion, I argue that Art. 19, para. 1, TEU could be autonomously en-
forced within infringement proceedings against national governments which impair the 
independence of their judicial systems (Section IV). 
II. The case of Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses 
ii.1. The facts and the preliminary reference 
The Portuguese legislature temporarily reduced the remuneration of certain categories 
of civil servants. Under implementing administrative measures, the remuneration of the 
Court of Auditors’ judges was also reduced. The ASJP, an association of Portuguese 
magistrates, acting on behalf of the Court of Auditors’ judges, brought an action for an-
nulment against the implementing measures to the Supreme Administrative Court. The 
ASJP alleged a breach of the principle of judicial independence, enshrined in Art. 19, pa-
ra. 1, TEU and Art. 47 of the Charter.10 The Supreme Administrative Court agreed that 
the independence of judicial bodies depends on the guarantees that are attached to 
 
9 Court of Justice: order of 7 March 2013, case C-127/12, Sindicato dos Bancários do Norte; order of 
26 June 2014, case C-264/12, Sindacato Nacional dos Profissionais de Seguro v. Fidelidade Mundial. See 
also C. KILPATRICK, Are the Bailouts Immune to EU Social Challenge Because They Are Not EU Law?, in Eu-
ropean Constitutional Law Review, 2014, pp. 393-421. 
10 Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, cit., para. 16. 
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their members’ status, including terms of remuneration.11 Hence, it referred to the 
Court of Justice a question of whether Art. 19, para. 1, TEU and Art. 47 of the Charter 
preclude the Portuguese measures reducing judicial remuneration. 
ii.2. The opinion of Advocate General 
Having considered the preliminary questions of admissibility and jurisdiction, the Advo-
cate General noted that the scope of application of Art. 19, para. 1, TEU and Art. 47 of 
the Charter is laid out differently.12 To assess whether Art. 19, para. 1, TEU is applicable 
to the situation of domestic judges, one needs to verify whether these judges “are likely 
to exercise their judicial activity in areas covered by EU law, and therefore to act as Eu-
ropean judges”.13 The Advocate General then held that the judges of the Court of Audi-
tors adversely affected by the impugned Portuguese measures may indeed be required 
to rule on cases falling within the scope of EU law. Subsequently, to hold that Art. 47 of 
the Charter was applicable to the situation of domestic judges, the Advocate General 
examined, in accordance with Art. 51 of the Charter governing its scope of application, 
whether the impugned Portuguese measure had implemented specific EU provisions.14 
The Advocate General found that such specific EU provisions were contained in the 
Council Implementing Decision 2014/234,15 which obliged Portugal to rationalise remu-
neration policy across all careers in the public sector.16 
As concerns the case’s substance, the Advocate General stated that Art. 19, para. 1, 
TEU obliges the Member States to designate courts with jurisdiction to settle disputes aris-
ing under the EU law and to lay down relevant procedural rules, whereas this provision 
does not deal with judicial independence.17 On the contrary, Art. 47, para. 2, of the Char-
ter explicitly provides for the right to an independent tribunal. The Advocate General in-
terpreted the concept of independence in Art. 47, para. 2, of the Charter in light of Art. 6, 
para. 1, of the European Convention on Human Rights18 and various instruments of the 
Council of Europe.19 He concluded that although the remuneration of judges must be 
commensurate with the importance of their function, it must also consider economic real-
 
11 Ibid., para. 17. 
12 Opinion of AG Saugmandsgaard Øe delivered on 18 May 2017, case C-64/16, Associação Sindical 
dos Juízes Portugueses, para. 36. Under Art. 19, para. 1, TEU, “Member States shall provide remedies suf-
ficient to ensure effective legal protection in the fields covered by Union law” (emphasis added). 
13 Opinion of AG Saugmandsgaard Øe, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, cit., para. 41. 
14 Ibid., para. 43. 
15 Council Implementing Decision 2014/234/EU of 23 April 2014 amending Implementing Decision 
2011/344/EU on granting Union financial assistance to Portugal, pp. 75-83. 
16 Opinion of AG Saugmandsgaard Øe, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, cit., para. 52. 
17 Ibid., paras 61-67. 
18 Ibid., paras 72-75. 
19 Ibid., para. 76. 
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ity.20 Reductions of judicial remuneration are not prohibited as such but must pursue a 
legitimate public interest and be proportionate.21 In conclusion, the Advocate General 
held that the challenged Portuguese measures were not contrary to EU law. 
ii.3. The judgment of the Court 
The Court agreed with the Advocate General regarding both the admissibility of prelim-
inary reference and the scope of application of Art. 19, para. 1, TEU.22 It highlighted that 
Art. 19 TEU operationalises the value of the rule of law enshrined in Art. 2 TEU.23 How-
ever, unlike the Advocate General, the Court held that Art. 19, para. 1, TEU entails also 
an obligation to ensure that national courts adjudicating in the fields covered by EU law 
meet the requirements of independence.24 Also in contrast to the Advocate General, 
the Court did not examine separately the applicability of Art. 47 of the Charter and 
based its reasoning mostly on Art. 19, para. 1, TEU. 
Cases relating to EU own resources and the use of financial resources from the EU 
were within the jurisdictional remit of the Portuguese Court of Auditors. Hence, in the 
Court’s view, Portugal must ensure that its judges enjoy a sufficient level of independ-
ence required under Art. 19, para. 1, TEU.25 To interpret the concept of independence, 
the Court reached to the case-law developed under Art. 47 of the Charter26 but the 
formal point of reference for the assessment of the impugned national measure re-
mained Art. 19, para. 1, TEU. In particular, the Court of Justice held that an independent 
court is one that exercises its judicial functions wholly autonomously, without being 
subject to any hierarchical constraint and without taking orders from anybody, enjoying 
protection against external interventions and pressures.27 The Court of Justice admitted 
that the receipt by judges of a level of remuneration commensurate with the im-
portance of their function constitutes a guarantee essential to judicial independence.28 
Nonetheless, since the impugned measures applied to various groups of civil servants, 
were temporary, and aimed at Portugal’s excessive budget deficit, they could not be 
considered to impair judicial independence.29 
 
20 Ibid., para. 78. 
21 Ibid., para. 79. 
22 Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, cit., para. 25. 
23 Ibid., paras 31-32. 
24 Ibid., paras 34-38. 
25 Ibid., paras 39-40. 
26 Ibid., paras 41-42. 
27 Ibid., para. 44. 
28 Ibid., para. 45. 
29 Ibid., paras 46-51. 
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III. Analysis: The relationship between Art. 19, para. 1, TEU and Art. 47 
of the Charter 
iii.1. The enforceable rule of law clause in the EU Treaties 
The Court of Justice took the opportunity provided by the Portuguese Supreme Admin-
istrative Court to confirm that Art. 19, para. 1, TEU is a justiciable rule of law clause of 
the EU Treaties. Even before the ASJP judgment, Art. 19, para. 1, TEU has rightly been 
named “the most important provision of the Treaties in that it confirms that the Union 
in all its aspects is exclusively governed by the law”.30 Doctrinal discussions about legal 
means to counteract the constitutional backsliding in Poland and Hungary have hitherto 
revolved around Art. 2 TEU. Opinions about whether this provision can be enforced 
within Art. 258 TFEU infringement proceedings have been divided.31 Notwithstanding, 
the scholarly attention should now turn to Art. 19, para. 1, TEU. 
Art. 19, para. 1, TEU, in the Court’s words, “gives concrete expression to the value of 
the rule of law stated in Article 2 TEU”.32 The very existence of effective judicial review 
by independent courts designed to ensure compliance with EU law is of the essence of 
the rule of law.33 For this reason, Art. 19, para. 1, TEU imposes on the Member States 
obligations regarding the organisation of their judicial systems, even though it leaves 
them considerable discretion in the choice of concrete institutional and procedural ar-
rangements. Importantly, the principle of national authorities’ “procedural autonomy” – 
which is oftentimes understood as a national prerogative or an expression of national 
sovereignty34 – in the ASJP judgment is rather a set of obligations regarding access to 
justice, fair procedures and judicial independence.35 
 
30 R. BARENTS, EU Remedies and Procedures before the EU Courts, Alphen aan den Rijn: Wolters 
Kluwer International, 2016, p. 116. 
31 M. DAWSON, E. MUIR, M. CLAES, A Tool-box for legal and Political Mobilisation in European Equality 
Law, in D. ANAGNOSTOU (ed.), Rights and Courts in Pursuit of Social Change. Legal Mobilisation in the Multi-
Level European System, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 117; K.L. SCHEPPELE, Enforcing the Basic 
Principles of EU Law through Systemic Infringement Actions, in D. KOCHENOV, C. CLOSA, Reinforcing the Rule 
of Law Oversight in the European Union, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017; D. KOCHENOV, L. 
PECH, Better Late than Never? On the European Commission’s Rule of Law Framework and its First Activa-
tion, in Journal of Common Market Studies, 2016, pp. 1062-1074, p.1065. 
32 Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, cit., para. 32. 
33 Ibid., paras 36-37. 
34 C.N. KAKOURIS, Do the Member States Possess Judicial Procedural “Autonomy”?, in Common Market 
Law Review, 1997, pp. 1389-1412; M. BOBEK, Why There is No Principle of ‘Procedural Autonomy’ of the 
Member States, in B. DE WITTE, H.-W. MICKLITZ (eds), The European Court of Justice and the Autonomy of 
the Member States, Cambridge: Intersentia, 2012, pp. 305-323. 
35 Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, cit., para. 34. See also, D.U. GALETTA, Procedural Auton-
omy of EU Member States: Paradise Lost? A Study on the ‘Functionalised Procedural Competence’ of EU 
Member States, Heidelberg: Springer, 2010; E. CANNIZZARO, Sui rapporti fra sistemi processuali nazionali e 
diritto dell’Unione europea, in Il Diritto dell’Unione europea, 2008, pp. 447-468; N. PÓŁTORAK, European 
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That Art. 19, para. 1, TEU has such a huge potential for the defence and consolida-
tion of rule of law standards in the Member States may be surprising in light of this pro-
vision’s inconspicuous origin. Its story begins with the Unión de Pequeños Agricultores 
judgment, in which the Court refused to relax the admissibility criteria of annulment ac-
tions brought against EU measures of general application by private applicants.36 As a 
result, such measures remained outside the scope of direct actions for judicial review, 
irrespective of their impact on legally protected interests of individuals. The issue was 
later discussed within the Convention for the Future of Europe.37 The Member States 
decided to include in the Treaty what is now Art. 19, para. 1, TEU. They intended to high-
light the obligation of Member States to ensure effective judicial protection of the rights 
enjoyed by individuals under EU law in the areas outside of the Court of Justice’s juris-
diction, if necessary even by creating new legal avenues and remedies.38  
Arguably, the consideration of authors’ intentions underpins the careful approach 
to Art. 19, para. 1, TEU by the Advocate General, although the intentions of the Treaty 
authors are not formally binding on the Court.39 The Advocate General proposed to in-
terpret the provision as imposing only obligations relating to a complete system of 
remedies and procedures but not to judicial independence. In my view, this interpreta-
tion is very difficult to defend. The concept of effective judicial protection, enshrined ei-
ther in Art. 19, para. 1, TEU or Art. 47 of the Charter, forms a logical and coherent 
whole. Even though its particular elements, such as access to justice, procedural fair-
ness or judicial independence can be distinguished for analytical purposes, they are all 
together indispensable conditions for the rule of law. The concept of “remedies suffi-
cient to ensure effective legal protection” presupposes and is inextricably linked to judi-
cial independence. One could hardly talk of effective, or in fact any legal protection wor-
thy of its name, if a legal avenue to apply for a remedy, for instance against an adminis-
trative act, was indeed available but the final decision rested in the hands of a judge 
subordinated to the administration being a defendant in the trial. 
 
Union Rights in National Courts, Alphen aan den Rijn: Wolters Kluwer, 2015; A. WALLERMAN, Towards an EU 
Law Doctrine on the Exercise of Discretion in National Courts? The Member States’ Self-Imposed Limits on 
National Procedural Autonomy, in Common Market Law Review, 2016, pp. 339-360. 
36 Court of Justice, judgment of 25 July 2002, case C-50/00 P, Unión de Pequeños Agricultores. 
37 A. ARNULL, Judicial Review in the European Union, in D. CHALMERS, A. ARNULL (eds), The Oxford Hand-
book of European Union Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015, pp. 377-401, p. 390. 
38 Court of Justice, judgment of 13 March 2007, case C-432/05, Unibet, para. 41. See also Court of Jus-
tice: judgment of 3 October 2013, case C-583/11 P, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami, paras 91-94; judgment of 28 
April 2015, case C-456/13 P, T&L Sugars, para. 45. 
39 However, travaux préparatoires may be helpful in interpreting Treaty provisions. See for instance, 
Opinion of AG Kokott delivered on 17 January 2013, case C-583/11 P, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami, paras 33-47. 
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iii.2. The objective principle of judicial independence and the subjective 
right to an independent judge 
One could ask why the Court opted for a novel solution and based its judgment on Art. 
19, para. 1, TEU instead of following a well-established path of Art. 47 of the Charter. 
This is even more surprising as first the Court chose Art. 19, para. 1, TEU but later it 
linked its content with that of Art. 47 of the Charter. The latter has a prominent role in 
the Court’s case-law, whereas Art. 19, para. 1, TEU had never served as an autonomous 
standard for the review of national laws. What first comes to mind is that the Court 
aimed at laying the groundwork for possible future cases against Poland. Unlike the 
ASJP case, the majority of changes in the organisation of judicial system contested in the 
Polish case have no link with any specific EU provision. Hence, the application of Art. 47 
of the Charter to a Polish case would be difficult.40  
One commentator asked rhetorically whether the Court, with the ASJP judgment, had 
reconfigured the EU constitutional order.41 In fact, the Court did not invent any new legal 
norm, that would not have already existed in the EU legal order. Rather, it enhanced the 
enforceability of the rule of law standards vis-à-vis the EU Member States. In the after-
math of the ASJP judgment, it seems that the legal obligations stemming from Art. 19, pa-
ra. 1, TEU or Art. 47 of the Charter overlap. However, what differs is their scope of applica-
tion (ratione materiae) and, consequently, the manner in which they can be enforced. 
Art. 47 of the Charter is interpreted by case-law in accordance with the dominant 
paradigm of fundamental rights as subjective rights.42 Art. 47 of the Charter expresses a 
subjective right: a permission to demand from public authorities specific actions – 
providing a legal avenue, fair procedure before an independent tribunal, etc. – and the 
corresponding obligation of the latter to satisfy this demand.43 The scope of application 
of this subjective right is set out by the same Art. 47 and also Art. 51 of the Charter, 
which governs the Charter’s scope of application in general. It follows from these two 
provisions that one can exercise the right in question before national courts, if she can 
make a reasonable claim that she has suffered a “violation” of her “rights and freedoms” 
which are protected by EU norms.44 
 
40 See further, M. TABOROWSKI, The Commission takes a step back in the fight for the Rule of Law, in 
Verfassungsblog, 3 January 2018, verfassungsblog.de. 
41 M. OVÁDEK, Has the CJEU just Reconfigured the EU Constitutional Order?, cit. 
42 See the case-law origins of the right to effective judicial protection, Court of Justice: judgment of 15 
May 1986, case 222/84, Johnston, para. 18; judgment of 15 October 1987, case 222/86, Heylens, para. 14. 
43 See, R. ALEXY, Theory of Constitutional Rights, translated by J. RIVERS, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2010, pp. 111-120. 
44 In practice, it arguably suffices that an individual relies on an EU provision the application of which 
can provide her with an advantage or can cause her a harm of hardship. See the recent judgment of the 
Court of Justice of 16 May 2017, case C-682/15, Berlioz Investment Fund, paras 45-52. See however, opin-
ion of AG Bobek delivered on 7 September 2017, case C-403/16, El-Hassani, para. 74 et seq. 
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Thus, Art. 47 of the Charter is geared towards the protection of individuals who wish 
to take advantage of specific EU provisions. It enables the Court within the preliminary 
reference procedure45 to review particular procedures before domestic courts used to 
enforce EU law in concrete cases. Examples include procedures for the judicial review of 
abusive clauses in consumer contracts,46 asylum47 or public procurement decisions,48 just 
to name a few. The range of issues already considered by the CU covers the rules on ac-
cess to justice,49 procedural rights of the parties,50 rules on evidence,51 jurisdiction52 and 
powers of courts,53 or even judicial independence,54 and also this list is not exhaustive. 
However, in all of these cases, the Court’s scrutiny was necessarily limited to one concrete 
type of domestic judicial procedure used by the applicant in the main case. At the same 
time, Art. 47 of the Charter – due to the manner of its application – is ill-suited to enable 
the Court to scrutinise the design of a national judicial system as a whole. 
Although the Court’s reasoning suggests that Art. 19, para. 1, TEU expresses the 
same normative requirements as Art. 47 of the Charter,55 its scope of application is set 
out differently. Art. 19, para. 1, TEU is applicable to courts and procedures functioning 
“in the fields covered by Union law”. Such courts may be called, under domestic provi-
sions marking out their jurisdiction, to interpret and apply EU law. The application of 
Art. 19, para. 1, TEU to review the organisation of domestic courts and procedures is 
 
45 However, EU standards of effective judicial protection were also enforced within infringement pro-
ceedings to a specific type of national procedure. Court of Justice, judgment of 13 February 2014, case C-
530/11, Commission v the UK. 
46 Court of Justice, judgment of 17 July 2014, case C-169/14, Juan Carlos Sánchez Morcillo. 
47 Court of Justice, judgment of 26 July 2017, case C-348/16, Moussa Sacko. 
48 Court of Justice, judgment of 15 September 2016, joined cases C-439/14 and C-488/14, Star Storage. 
49 Court of Justice: judgment of 8 November 2016, case C-243/15, Lesoochranárske zoskupenie; judg-
ment of 6 October 2015, case C-61/14, Orizzonte Salute; judgment of 22 December 2010, case C-279/09, DEB. 
50 Court of Justice, judgment of 4 June 2013, case C-300/11, ZZ. 
51 Court of Justice, judgment of 27 September 2017, case C-73/16, Peter Puškár, paras 87-98. 
52 Court of Justice, judgment of 6 September 2012, case C-619/10, Trade Agency. 
53 Court of Justice, judgment of 14 March 2013, case C-415/11, Mohamed Aziz. 
54 Court of Justice: judgment of 19 September 2006, case C-506/04, Wilson; judgment of 31 January 
2013, case C-175/11, H.I.D. & B.A.. 
55 What could also be helpful in interpreting the requirements of effective judicial protection is the 
case-law regarding the concept of the “court or tribunal” under Art. 267 TFEU – see the ASJP judgment, 
para. 44 and the case-law cited. The question remains, though, what is the relationship between effective 
judicial protection and the more senior principle of effectiveness, which next to the principle of equiva-
lence frames the procedural autonomy of the Member States. See, Court of Justice, judgment of 5 No-
vember 2014, case C-166/13, Makarubega. See further, J. KROMMENDIJK, Is there light on the horizon? The 
distinction between Rewe-effectiveness and the principle of effective judicial protection in Article 47 of 
the Charter after Orizzonte, in Common Market Law Review, 2016, pp. 1395-1418; M. SAFJAN, D. 
DÜSTERHAUS, A Union of Effective Judicial Protection: Addressing a Multi-level Challenge through the Lens 
of Article 47 CFREU, in Yearbook of European Law, 2014, pp. 3-40. See also, Opinion of AG Kokott deliv-
ered on 30 March 2017, case C-73/16, Puškar, paras 50-51. 
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therefore “abstract”, whereas Art. 47 of the Charter is usually applicable within concrete 
proceedings involving the application of substantive EU provisions.56 
In other words, Art. 47 of the Charter expresses a subjective right and Art. 19, para. 
1, TEU expresses the same normative requirements in the form of an objective legal 
principle. Such a principle abstracts from the question of right-holders and their con-
crete cases and is intended to “radiate” on the organisation of domestic judicial sys-
tems.57 Any reform of these systems should take account of obligations stemming from 
Art. 19, para. 1, TEU. As it has turned out, by introducing this provision to the TEU, the 
Member States have authorised the Court of Justice – perhaps unwittingly – to review 
the organisation of their judicial systems, in procedural and institutional aspects alike, 
outside the context of specific EU provisions or concrete legal disputes. The only condi-
tion is that the parts of national judicial systems concerned are likely to deal with EU law 
cases. It should be emphasised however that arguably Art. 19, para. 1, TEU does not 
impose any legal obligations that could not have been inferred from the pre-Lisbon 
general principle of effective judicial protection and effectiveness, or from Art. 47 of the 
Charter. The enshrining of effective judicial protection in the Treaty as both a funda-
mental subjective right and as an objective legal principle is perfectly justified in light of 
the importance of this legal norm for the rule of law. 
Therefore, the contribution of Art. 19, para. 1, TEU is rather procedural in nature 
and consists in making the enforcement of the rule of law standards before the Court 
easier and more straightforward. To enforce Art. 47 of the Charter within the action for 
infringement under Art. 258 TFEU, the Commission must indicate a precise provision of 
substantive EU law which cannot be effectively enforced at the national level due to the 
lack of independent courts or fair procedures. Alternatively, the EU institutions can wait 
for an individual to initiate litigation before a national court and to invoke her rights un-
der Art. 47 of the Charter. In this case, the EU institution can only hope that the national 
judge will decide to refer the case to the Court of Justice under Art. 267 TFEU. In both 
cases, the impact of the Court’s judgment will be limited to this particular type of proce-
dure before national courts within which the indicated provisions of substantive EU law 
are being enforced. Therefore, Art. 47 of the Charter is ill-suited to remedy systemic vio-
lations of the rule of law, which permeate the entire national judicial system, and not 
only concern selected remedies and procedures. Meanwhile, Art. 19, para. 1, TEU re-
lieves the EU institutions from the formal restraints of Art. 51 of the Charter. It requires 
only to demonstrate that, in abstract, i.e. irrespective of any concrete case, potential 
cases involving the application of EU law are in the jurisdiction of domestic courts con-
 
56 However, the Court’s preliminary reference judgments regarding Art. 47 of the Charter responding 
to the questions by a specific referring court are also binding in all similar future cases, or may hypotheti-
cally lead to legislative changes of procedural systems. 
57 On objective constitutional principles, as opposed to subjective rights, and on the “radiation the-
sis”, see R. ALEXY, Theory of Constitutional Rights, cit., pp. 352-354. 
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cerned. Art. 19, para. 1, TEU can thus serve as an autonomous basis for actions for in-
fringement by the Commission. Arguably, also a national court could invoke Art. 19, pa-
ra. 1, TEU to ask the Court of Justice about the independence of another State’s courts, 
while hearing the case regarding the mutual recognition of judicial decisions.58 
The way the Court of Justice interpreted the scope of application of Art. 19, para. 1, 
TEU finds also support in teleological considerations. Effective judicial protection 
through judicial review plays in the EU legal order a two-fold function: subjective and 
objective. As concerns the subjective function, it ensures the legal protection of rights 
and freedoms guaranteed to individuals by EU law. Judicial independence is not a mat-
ter of the judge’s privilege but an aspect of the citizen’s right to have her case settled 
objectively and impartially. As concerns the objective function, effective judicial protec-
tion enables the effective enforcement of EU provisions and their uniform interpreta-
tion in national legal orders. By accepting to review the independence of national 
courts, the Court of Justice secures the conditions for fulfilling both functions of effec-
tive judicial protection.59 Not only does the Court thus protect the rights and freedoms 
of EU citizens but also what it has traditionally called the “autonomy” of EU law.60 As the 
Court has recalled in its recent Achmea judgment, the Member States are obliged to en-
sure in their respective territories the uniform and consistent application of EU law. In 
accordance with Art. 19, para. 1, TEU, it is for the national courts and the Court of Justice 
to ensure the full application of EU law in all Member States and to ensure judicial pro-
tection of the rights of individuals under that law. The keystone of the judicial as thus 
conceived is the preliminary ruling procedure.61 In other words, only by dint of the co-
operation between independent domestic judges, willing to make preliminary refer-
ences, can the Court of Justice effectively fulfil its mandate, which is to maintain the uni-
form application of EU law across the Member States.62 By impairing the independence 
of their own courts, Member States automatically compromise the Court of Justice’s 
ability to receive preliminary references. 
The Court was therefore right to assert its jurisdiction, under Art. 19, para. 1, TEU, to 
review the Portuguese provisions on the remuneration of judges. Art. 19, para. 1, TEU al-
lowed the Court to overcome the limitations inherent in Arts 47 and 51 of the Charter and 
 
58 See judgment of the Irish High Court of 12 March 2018, Record No. 2013 EXT 295, 2014 EXT 8, 2017 
EXT 291, The Minister for Justice and Equality v Artur Celmer, which invoked however Art. 6 of the Euro-
pean Convention of Human Rights and Art. 2 TEU, and not Art. 19, para. 1, TEU. Moreover, one could even 
imagine a situation in which a national judge asks the Court of Justice, on the basis of Art. 19, para. 1, TEU, 
about the requirements of independence applicable to her own judicial system, for instance having re-
ceived an appeal from a lower-level judge dismissed by a member of the executive power. 
59 Art. 19, para. 1, TEU, first sentence: “The Court of Justice […] shall ensure that in the interpretation 
and application of the Treaties the law is observed”. 
60 Court of Justice, judgment of 28 March 2017, case C-72/15, Rosneft, paras 66-75. 
61 Court of Justice, judgment of 6 March 2018, case C-284/16, Achmea BV, paras 32-37. 
62 Court of Justice, opinion 2/13 of 18 December 2014, paras 174-176. 
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the paradigm of subjective rights. The Court demonstrated an understanding of the cur-
rent challenges to judicial independence in several Member States and their seriousness, 
which requires using the full remedial potential of EU law. In this respect, the Court’s atti-
tude resembles the approach adopted by the Grand Chamber of the European Court of 
Human Rights in the case Baka v Hungary of 2016. That case was brought by a former 
president of the Hungarian Supreme Court. He had been removed from office by means 
of an amendment to the constitution and deprived of the right to judicial review.63 The 
European Court of Human Rights showed that traditional juristic concepts, such as subjec-
tive rights and the distinction between official and private actions, cannot freeze the dy-
namic interpretation of the Convention and force the European Court of Human Rights to 
ignore the proliferation of challenges to the rule of law in Europe. With the judgment in 
ASJP, the Court of Justice – just like the European Court of Human Rights in Baka v Hunga-
ry – embraced firmly the role of a European constitutional court.64 
IV. Enforcing the rule of law towards EU Member States 
Undoubtedly, the ASJP judgment underscores the potential of EU law to consolidate and 
defend the rule of law structures in EU Member States. It proves that the Court is de-
termined to take the rule of law seriously. Arguably, this is not the first reminder. The 
Court’s determination to defend the rule of law was already observed within the in-
fringement proceedings against Poland regarding the Białowieża Forest.65 The Court 
showed readiness to impose under Art. 279 TFEU, for the first time, a periodic penalty 
payment on a Member State that had failed to comply with the Court’s interim meas-
ure. The Court relied in this respect on the rule of law value enshrined in Art. 2 TEU.66  
The ASJP judgment should also serve as a reminder to the Commission about it du-
ties as the guardian of the Treaties and, consequently, the guardian of the rule of law. 
Since Art. 19, para. 1, TEU provides for an objective principle of effective judicial protec-
tion binding upon the Member States, it can be enforced by means of infringement 
proceedings autonomously, i.e. without the Commission having to rely on other, more 
precise EU provisions. As observed by Pech and Kochenov, the main deficiency of in-
fringement proceedings lays in the approach of the Commission.67 It has hitherto inter-
preted its powers under Art. 258 TFEU as confined to areas where specific EU provisions 
 
63 European Court of Human Rights, judgment of 23 June 2016, no. 20261/12, Baka v Hungary. 
64 See, European Court of Human Rights, judgment of 23 June 2016, no. 20261/12, Baka v Hungary, 
joint concurring opinion of judges Pinto de Albuquerque and Dedov, p. 90. 
65 D. SARMIENTO, Provisional (and Extraordinary) Measures in the Name of the Rule of Law, in Verfas-
sungsblog, 24 November 2017, verfassungsblog.de. 
66 Court of Justice, order of 20 November 2017, case C-441/17 R, Commission v Poland, paras 102-104. 
67 D. KOCHENOV, L. PECH, Better Late than Never?, cit. 
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have been breached by a Member State.68 The ASJP judgment has proven the Commis-
sion to be wrong. It has confirmed that Art. 19, para. 1, TEU operationalises the rule of 
law value enshrined in Art. 2 TEU and gives it the form of a perfectly justiciable legal 
norm. Hence, the Commission can now be sure that it has at its disposal a potentially 
effective legal tool that it can use to consolidate and defend the rule of law structures at 
the national level. Whether the Commission, a guardian of the rule of law, will success-
fully use this tool depends now largely on its political will. 
The Court of Justice will have to deal with the remaining part of the Athena’s di-
lemma in future cases regarding the controversial “reform” of the Polish judicial sys-
tem.69 Will the Court, like Athena, prescribe the standards of judicial independence and 
fair trial, embracing the role of the rule of law enforcer? If so, how will it appease en-
raged governments and how will the EU institutions ensure the effectiveness of the 
judgment? Will the threat of financial sanctions under Art. 260 TFEU suffice? In “Eumen-
ides”, Athena chose instead the strategy of persuasion and inclusion. In fact, the Aes-
chylus’ drama was the metaphor of political situation in Athens, where the old aristoc-
racy, represented by the Erinyes, was losing their power to the people who, like Apollo, 
wished to create a new and more just legal order. The Aeschylus’s message was that, 
despite inevitable changes, the rising people must convince the old aristocracy that the 
latter still have a place in the common polis.70 
 
68 Communication COM(2014) 158 final of 11 March 2014 from the Commission to the European Par-
liament and the Council, A New Framework to Strengthen the Rule of Law, p. 5. 
69 Rule of Law: European Commission acts to defend judicial independence in Poland, European 
Commission press release of 20 December 2017. See also, Court of Justice, case C-216/18 PPU, Minister 
for Justice and Equality (Défaillances du système judiciaire), still pending. 
70 C. MEIER, The Greek Discovery of Politics, cit. 
 
